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I. INTRODUCTION
Much controversy has accompanied the forced use of antipsychotic
drugs on civilly committed mental patients, where the drugs are used to
regain mental health, and on mentally ill criminal defendants, where the
drugs are used to attain competency to stand trial.1 Legal scholarship
has discussed the dangerous side effects which antipsychotic medications
often produce, effects which occur even where the drugs are responsibly
administered with great care for the patient.2 The interest of a patient/
defendant in avoiding the potential adverse side effects of antipsychotic
drugs may be in conflict with the asserted state interests in forcible
medication: management of the mentally ill and restoring competency to
stand trial. The American Psychiatric Association supports forcible med-
ication as a method of treatment that has been proven highly effective
and often essential for patients requiring involuntary psychiatric hos-
pitalization. 3 Within the judicial system, there has been clear disagree-
' Antipsychotic drugs are also known as neuroleptics and major tranquilizers.
The term "antipsychotic" will be used throughout this Note. Antipsychotic med-
ications are a subclass of psychotropic medications - drugs used in treating psy-
chiatric problems - and are known to the lay person by their brand names, such
as Thorazine, Prolixin, Haldol, Stelazine, and Navane. See generally Brooks, The
Constitutional Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medications, 8 BULL. AM. AcAD. Psy-
cHiATRY & L. 179 (1980) [hereinafter Antipsychotic Medication].
2Id. at 183-88.3 Brief of American Psychiatric Association at 6, Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291(1982). See also ABA CREIINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDs 7-4.10 (1989)
[hereinafter MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDs]. The APA believes that even a qualified
right to refuse treatment places mental health professionals in the difficult po-
sition for being responsible for patients who as a result of refusal may receive
improper or inadequate treatment. For a description of the most recent APA
guidelines for nonjudicial review where a patient refuses antipsychotic medica-
tion, see Review Procedure for Medication Refusal Cases, Psychiatric News, Feb.
2, 1990, at 5, col. 1 (provision is made for a psychiatrist from outside the treating
facility, appointed by the director of the facility, to determine whether the med-
ication is necessary and, optionally, whether the patient is incompetent to consent;
no judicial involvement is contemplated).
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
ment on the issue of forcibly administering antipsychotic medication. 4
Even among psychiatric professionals there remains a deep schism be-
tween those who follow the Freudian psychodynamic model of mental
illness5 which logically rejects forcible medication, and biologically ori-
ented psychiatrists whose medical model embraces drug therapy as the
treatment of choice.6
The purpose of this Note is to analyze what right, if any, exists for a
mentally ill criminal defendant to refuse the administration of antipsy-
chotic drugs to gain competence to stand trial. Focusing mainly on the
trial context of the right to refuse is not to suggest that there is not
overlap between the right of a criminal defendant to refuse and the right
of a civilly committed patient to refuse. Indeed, it is often unclear why
an individual is brought to the emergency room of a general hospital and
eventually committed, rather than being arrested and booked and later
found incompetent to stand trial.7 The constitutional analysis of the right
of a mentally ill defendant to refuse antispychotic drugs is informed by
the existence of a similar right in the civil commitment area, although
the state interests in these two areas differ; while the state interest in
forcibly medicating a defendant for the purpose of standing trial is that
' For two recent decisions, see Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W. 2d 139 (Minn. 1988)
and United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988). In Jarvis, the supreme
court of Minnesota held that the involuntary administration of antipsychotic
medication to an involuntarily committed, mentally ill patient in a nonemergency
situation constituted intrusive treatment and required prior judicial approval. In
Charters, the fourth circuit gave wide latitude to the Federal Correction Insti-
tution to administer antipsychotic drugs forcibly where one of the governmental
interests was to maintain a pretrial detainee in a competent condition to stand
trial.5This branch of psychiatry stresses verbal psychotherapy and has influenced
some in the judiciary to automatically bar the use of drugs while a defendant is
on trial. Winick, Psychotropic Medication and Competence to Stand Trial, 3 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 769, 790 (1977).
6 However, even the medical supporters admit that the antipsychotic drugs
sometimes inadvertently have powerful side effects. The most notorious of these
is tardive dyskinesia, manifested by grotesque movements of the face, tongue,
mouth and limbs. For many patients this condition is irreversible and has no
known cure. See Antipsychotic Medication, supra note 1, at 185. Its cause is
unknown beyond that it is a common reaction to protracted use of antipsychotic
drugs. Some estimates claim that it affects over fifty percent of long-term antip-
sychotic drug users. See Note, A Common Law Remedy for Forcible Medication
of the Institutionalized Mentally Ill, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1720, 1726 n. 66 (1982).
"One does not need a medical degree to realize we are not discussing aspirin."
Jones v. Gerhardstein, 141 Wis. 2d 710, 726, 416 N.W. 2d 883, 890 (1987) (holding
that although incompetent to stand trial, if an individual is competent to make
decisions regarding the acceptance of antipsychotic drugs he cannot be forcibly
administered them).
7 Whether a person becomes labelled a criminal or a mental patient at the
outset may be due in large part to a decision made by a police officer. For a
discussion on the difference the classification makes, see Steadman, Mental Health
Law and the Criminal Offender: Research Directions For The 1990's, 39 RUTGERS
L. REV. 323 (1987). See also Note, Just Say Yes: The Fourth Circuit (En Banc)
Denies Pretrial Detainee's Right to Refuse Psychotropic Medication in United
States v. Charters, 12 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 117 n.2 (1990).
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of trying those accused in good faith of violating its laws, the interests
in coercing antipsychotic drug treatment in the civil commitment area
are patient control, treatment, and fiscal concerns.8 This Note first ana-
lyzes the relationship between competency and ability and then presents
the arguments supporting the view that a defendant should have no
meaningful right to refuse medication. After presenting the legal analysis
supporting the right to refuse antipsychotic drugs in the trial setting, the
Note proceeds to consider several possible alternatives to forced drugging
as a means toward achieving the state's goal of a fair trial and concludes
that these alternatives, while arguably less effective than medication,
are preferable to forced drugging since they more adequately address the
legitimate concerns of both the state and the mentally ill criminal de-
fendant.
Unfortunately, the issue of the right to refuse antipsychotic medication
has not yet been directly addressed by the Supreme Court. In the 1982
case, Mills v. Rogers,9 the Court granted certiorari on the very issue of
whether an involuntarily committed mental patient has a constitutional
right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs in a non-emergency
situation. However, the Court sidestepped the constitutional issues raised
by Mills by remanding the case to the First Circuit Court to consider how
an intervening state case may have changed the state law.10 In its 1985
decision in Ake v. Oklahoma," the Court held that due process requires
that a state provide access to a psychiatrist's assistance on the issue of
sanity at the time of an offense where sanity is likely to be a significant
defense for an indigent defendant. Although Ake petitioned for a writ of
certiorari on the issue of his competence to stand trial while being ad-
ministered antipsychotic drugs, the Court purposely failed to address this
claim.12 There has been optimism that the Supreme Court would finally
8 See infra note 187 and accompanying test.
9 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
"0 The intervening state case was In re Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E. 2d 40
(1981) which held that a noninstitutionalized, mentally incompetent patient had
a right to a judicial hearing at which he could assert his refusal to treatment
with antipsychotic drugs. The Mills case saw its ultimate resolution in Rogers v.
Commissioner of Dept. of Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.W. 2d 308 (1983),
which held that in a nonemergency situation, no state interest is sufficiently
compelling to overcome a patient's decision to refuse. If a patient is found com-
petent, he cannot be forced to take or continue to take antipsychotic medication;
if he is found to be incompetent, a judicial substituted judgment treatment plan
must be implemented. Massachusetts is at the forefront of enforcing a right to
refuse with judicial intervention; perhaps surprisingly, the scheme is working.
See Schmidt & Geller, Involuntary Administration of Medication in the Com-
munity: The Judicial Opportunity, 17 BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 283
(1989).
" 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
12 Id. at 74 n.2. Although it is not clear from the case whether Ake voluntarily
submitted to Thorazine treatment, the Court could have subjected the issue of
drug induced competence to constitutional analysis. The state interest to induce
"synthetic competence" would be present in a right to force such competency.
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address the constitutional right to refuse issue with its granting of cer-
tiorari in the 1988 case of Harper v. State.13 In Harper, the Supreme Court
of Washington held that a convicted prisoner had a protected liberty
interest in refusing antipsychotic drugs and that a judicial hearing was
1- 110 Wash. 2d 873, 759 P.2d 358 (1988), cert. granted, Washington v. Harper,
109 S. Ct. 2445 (1989). The Supreme Court's opinion in this case was announced
on February 27, 1990, in Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990). The Court
finally explicitly recognized the possession of a significant liberty interest under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in avoiding the unwanted
administration df antipsychotic drugs. Id. at 1036. However, in a 6-3 decision,
the majority held that the standard for determining the validity of the prison
regulation at issue in Harper was whether coercively medicating Harper was
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Id. at 1038. The Court
reasoned that since Harper posed a serious danger to the security of the prison
and had failed to demonstrate that physical restraints or seclusion would be
acceptable substitutes for the medical effectiveness of antipsychotic drugs (an
effect which, the Court emphasized, was also in the inmate's medical interest),
forcible medication in this case did not violate the Constitution. Id. at 1040. Thus,
the Court adopted the low level of scrutiny of the "reasonably related" test even
for a fundamental liberty right, since it was defining that right in the context of
an inmate's confinement. Id. at 1037. Although the opinion did not state as much,
its decision not to require a judicial rather than an institutional hearing to protect
Harper's procedural rights apparently flows from the low level of scrutiny used
to decide the substantive issue. Id. at 1040-44. Justice Stevens, writing for the
dissent, emphasized the severe deprivation of liberty that mind-altering drugs
represent and made reference to comparisons with electroconvulsive therapy and
psychosurgery. Id. at 1047. The dissent correctly observed that the majority's
assumption that drug treatment was in the inmate's medical interest was at best
weak and at worse false - the policy at issue in Harper did not require a deter-
mination that forced medication would advance the inmate's medical interests.
Id. at 1049 n.11. Impliedly, the dissent would have required a stricter level of
constitutional scrutiny to protect the substantive liberty right at stake. Fur-
thermore, the dissent described the lack of procedural due process inherent in an
in-house institutional review: this system "pits the interests of an inmate who
objects to forced medication against the judgment not only of his doctor, but often
his doctor's colleagues." Id. at 1052. 'The choice is not between medical experts
on the one hand and judges on the other; the choice is between decision makers
who are biased and those who are not." Id. n.20.
The implications of the Harper decision are not entirely clear. The majority
decision may be read narrowly as another in a series of prison cases which extend
weaker versions of fundamental rights to prisoners than enjoyed by non-prisoners.
Id. at 1037. Given a narrow interpretation, Harper could be used to support a
strong right to refuse antipsychotic drugs by a defendant not otherwise competent
to stand trial or by a civilly committed mental patient. Conversely, the great
deference shown by the majority to medical review and the assumption that a
medical decision is in the prisoner's best medical interest (and not mainly or only
for institutional control purposes) may be interpreted to support forced drugging
and non-judicial review outside the prison context. Unfortunately, the Harper
decision leaves many of the questions in the non-prison situation without direct
answers. Indeed, the decision is probably deserving of a Note unto itself to fully
work through all the possibilities.
1 The case holding is somewhat unique in that it required a judicial hearing
even though Harper was found to be a danger to others, 110 Wash. 2d at 875,
759 P.2d at 360. Other right to refuse cases have held that where a danger exists,
the liberty interest is outweighed by the state's legitimate objective to achieve
behavior acceptable to a safe society. See Dautremont v. Broadlawns Hosp., 827
F.2d 291 (8th Cir. 1987). See supra note 13.
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required before he could be forcibly medicated. 14
Prior to Harper, the closest the Court has come to discussing the issue
of forced therapeutic treatment was in the 1982 case of Youngberg v.
Romeo.'6 The plaintiff, Romeo, was a retarded man who had been insti-
tutionalized since childhood and sued the officials of a Pennsylvania state
institution for damages relating to violations of his liberty interests in
safe conditions of confinement and freedom from undue bodily restraint. 16
The relevance of Romeo on the issue of forcible medication is that the
Court held that even an individual subject to involuntary control by the
state retains a residuum of liberty that is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 7 The Romeo Court adopted a low level of scrutiny to de-
termine whether a patient's liberty rights had been unconstitutionally
violated; only where the treatment decision was "such a substantial de-
parture from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards as to
demonstrate that the person did not base the decision on such a judgment"
could liability be imposed.'8 Since the problems associated with care of
the mentally retarded may differ in many ways from those associated
with care of the mentally ill, it might therefore appear unclear as to
whether the decision in Romeo should control the right of the mentally
ill to refuse antipsychotic medication. In spite of this observation, the
Supreme Court nevertheless vacated two other right to refuse antipsy-
chotic drug cases to be decided in light of Romeo.'9 On remand, the ap-
plication of Romeo's professional judgment standard effectively altered
the definition of the constitutional right to refuse antipsychotic medica-
tion by a competent and non-dangerous mental patient in a non-emer-
gency situation from literally preventing medication administration to a
15457 U.S. 307 (1982).
16id. at 319.
171d.
18 Id. at 323. This standard is basically the same as that used in malpractice
claims.
19 Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated, 102 S. Ct. 3506 (1982);
Scott v. Plante, 641 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982). See
Perlin, Can Mental Health Professionals Predict Judicial Decision Making? Con-
stitutional and Tort Liability Aspects of the Right of the Institutional Mentally
Disabled to Refuse Treatment: On the Cutting Edge, 3 TouRo L. REV. 13,21 (1986).
An even more fundamental distinction between Romeo and the right to refuse
medication cases is that Romeo was, in effect, a right to treatment case where
the Court held that the state was required to provide Romeo with minimally
adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and freedom from undue re-
straint. There is a critical difference between the affirmative interference with
rights by the state through forcible medication of a patient/defendant and the
duty of the state, dealt with in Romeo, to take positive actions to promote rights.
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right to object or to a second opinion.20 It should be noted that Romeo
involved no allegation that a judicial hearing was required prior to en-
forced treatment. Much of the significance of Harper is that the issue of
the constitutional right to refuse is framed precisely in terms of a right
to judicial review, a right which would put some substance into the liberty
protection that mental patients supposedly enjoy.21
II. MENTAL COMPETENCY IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Originally, the requirement that a defendant be competent in order to
stand trial was based on the concept of procedural fairness.22 The com-
petency doctrine had its origins in mid-seventeenth century England
where counsel was prohibited in serious criminal cases and the defendant
was required to appear before the court and conduct his defense in his
own words.2 Consequently, during this period, it was critical to have a
competent defendant, for he alone conducted the defense. The procedural
fairness rationale was followed in the United States in the early cases of
Youtsey v. United States24 and United States v. Chisolm.2 5 More recent
opinions base the competency requirement on the due process clause of
the Constitution and derive it from the common law prohibition against
trials in absentia.2
6
What is the standard of competency below which a proceeding is unfair
and violates due process? The sixth circuit in Youtsey reversed the con-
viction of a defendant because the trial court had failed to inquire as to
whether epileptic seizures had rendered him "incapable of understanding
the proceedings, and intelligently advising with his counsel as to his
defense. '27 The Chisolm decision held that a defendant may stand trial
in a criminal case "if he rightly comprehends his own condition with
reference to the proceedings" and is able to "testify intelligently and give
See Brooks, The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medications: Law and Policy,
39 RuTGERS L. REv. 339 (1987). On remand, in Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d
Cir. 1983), the third circuit, in light of Romeo, upheld New Jersey's treatment
procedures, which provided a review system that simply required a treating doctor
to seek the approval of his treatment team for enforced medication.
21 It is unclear what effect, if any, recognition by the Supreme Court of a right
to a judicial hearing on the issue of forced medication would have for a criminal
defendant asserting the right to avoid coerced competence; in the trial setting
the decision to medicate would probably already involve a judicial determination
to proceed with enforced drugging or judicial notice that a defendant was only
competent to stand trial while on antipsychotic drugs.
22See generally R. RoESCH & S. GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL (1980).
2 See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND 94 (4th ed.
1783). This prohibition against the assistance of counsel continued in felony and
treason cases for centuries.
97 F. 937, 941 (6th Cir. 1899).
149 F. 284, 287 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1906).
See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375(1966). Incompetence to stand trial is viewed as removing a defendant from being
meaningfully present at the proceedings.
297 F. 937 at 946.
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his counsel all the material facts" in the case.2 8 Based on the common
law "understand and assist" standard of mental competency articulated
in Youtsey and Chisolm, the Supreme Court formulated the current stand-
ard in the 1960 case of Dusky v. United States ,' 9 the seminal decision on
the definition of competency to stand trial. The Court in Dusky stated
that the "test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and
whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the pro-
ceedings against him."3 0 Dusky is significant in that the Court held that
a defendant needed to be able to do more than identify facts; he must
have some capacity to reason from a simple premise to a simple conclu-
sion. 31
The standard articulated in Dusky for competence to stand trial is
obviously not the same standard that a mental health professional would
use to describe mental health; "mental health" describes a higher level
of competence than competency to stand trial requires. 32 It is also clear
that while a defendant may fall short of the requirements needed to be
competent to stand trial, he can still be competent enough to know that
he likes certain foods and is adversely affected by certain drugs and even
competent enough to intelligently refuse medication whose positive effect
is the attainment of the Dusky triability level.
III. THE CASE AGAINST A RIGHT TO REFUSE ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATION
TO ATTAIN COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL
The ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards3 recognizes no
meaningful right to refuse drug treatment to attain competency to stand
trial; on the contrary, a duty to undergo treatment to achieve a mental
state compatible with competency for trial is strongly implied:3 4
A person determined to be incompetent to stand trial and de-
tained or committed for treatment or habilitation or ordered
to appear for outpatient treatment or habilitation should have
no right to refuse ordinary and reasonable treatment or ha-
149 F. 284 at 287.
29362 U.S. 402 (1960).
- Id.
31 The Court disagreed with the trial judge's belief that if the defendant could
recognize "2" as "2" then it was not necessary that he be able to add "2 + 2" and
arrive at a total of "4." See Haddox, Gross & Pollack, Mental Competency to Stand
Trial While Under the Influence of Drugs, 7 LOYOLA L. REv. 425, 435-36 (1974).
32 For example, a defendant may meet the Dusky standard for competence to
stand trial, but may still suffer from delusions, may be manic-depressive, or
irresponsible, etc.
See MENTAL HEALTH STA NDARDS, supra note 3, at 7-4.10(d). The ABA House
of Delegates adopted the Mental Health Standards as chapter seven of the ABA
STANDARDS FOR CrMINAL JUSTICE on August 7, 1984.
34 Id.
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bilitation designed to effect competence. However, a defendant
should have the right to refuse any treatment or habilitation
which may impair the defendant's ability to prepare a defense
to the charge, which is experimental, or which has an unrea-
sonable risk of serious, hazardous or irreversible side effects .35
While Mental Health Standards maintains that defendants committed as
incompetent to undergo criminal trial proceedings are unable to refuse
treatment that may restore or attain competence for trial, a right to refuse
is recognized where competence for trial is not an issue:3 6
An offender who has been placed in a mental health or mental
retardation facility has the same right to decline habilitation
or mental health treatment as a civilly committed person in
that jurisdiction.3 7
In addition, even a prisoner involuntarily transferred to a mental health
or mental retardation facility is afforded the same right to refuse treat-
ment as a civilly committed person in the jurisdiction.38 What would
explain the recognition of some right to refuse treatment except where
the goal is competence for trial? Why is an incompetent detainee's liberty
interest in freedom from bodily intrusiveness more easily compromised
than the liberty interest of a prisoner or civilly committed patient?
The state's interests in subjecting its citizens to treatment without their
consent have been recognized in case law as falling into two distinct
categories: those arising from the state's authority to act as parens patriae
and those arising from the state's police power.3 9 The parens patriae ob-
ligation of the state is a doctrine which speaks to the welfare of the state's
citizenry as individuals. In the mental health context, the doctrine man-
dates treatment for those who require it and it requires respect for the
wishes of those who decline medication. The claim to reject treatment or
habilitation under other than emergency circumstances rests on the pre-
sumption that treatment is primarily, if not exclusively, for the benefit
of the convict/patient, not for the benefit of the criminal justice system.
Use of the parens patriae doctrine to force medication with antipsychotic
drugs generally rests upon a determination that the individual to whom
the drugs are to be administered lacks the capacity to decide for himself
whether to take the drugs.40 The state, under parens patriae logic, is
- Id.36 Id. 7-9.12, 7-10.9.37 Id. 7-9.12. This section of the Mental Health Standards concerns convicts
who are committed to mental health facilities because of severe mental illness
or to mental retardation facilities due to severe mental retardation; it does not
concern detainees awaiting trial.
18 See MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 7-10.9.
39 Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983); Rennie v. Klein, 462
F.Supp. 1131, 1145 (D.N.J. 1978).
40 Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 81 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985(1971). In Winters, the second circuit held that a competent, involuntarily ad-
mitted mental patient stated a claim under 28 U.S.C. §1343 (3)(1969) and 42
U.S.C. §1983 (1969) for having been medicated despite her religious objection. In
so holding, the court observed that the state's parens patriae powers could not be
used to force treatment without a judicial determination of incompetency. 446
F.2d at 71. Involuntary commitment of non-dangerous persons unable to survive
in freedom may also be predicated on the parens patriae power of the state.
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looking out for the incompetent's welfare, not just the welfare of the state
or of society as a whole. Since the parens patriae doctrine would support
a right to refuse forced antipsychotic medication unless a mentally ill
defendant is so incompetent as to be unable to intelligently assert a
refusal, the doctrine cannot be the source for the position of the Mental
Health Standards in denying a right to refuse where only incompetence
to stand trial is at issue.
Although the use of the police power doctrine has been seriously at-
tacked as a basis to forcibly medicate psychiatric patients,4 1 the premise
has added cogency in the context of achieving competence to be tried for
a crime. There is case law precedent employing police power to assert
state interests in enforcing justice or preventing health hazards. The
Supreme Court in 196642 held that the state's police power in gathering
evidence of a crime was sufficient to authorize forced extraction of blood
from a driver to determine whether he was driving while intoxicated. In
1976, the D.C. circuit court"3 held that the state's police power interest
in gathering evidence of a crime was sufficient to authorize involuntary
surgical removal of a bullet from a defendant's arm. These two cases
illustrate examples of situations in which the state's substantial interest
in the integrity of its criminal justice system has outweighed a private
interest in freedom from bodily intrusion."
The state's substantial interest in bringing to trial defendants accused
in good faith was recognized by the Supreme Court in the 1970 case of
Illinois v. Allen. 45 In describing that interest, the Court stated that "gov-
ernment has a sovereign prerogative to put on trial those accused in good
faith of violating valid laws. Constitutional power to bring an accused to
trial is fundamental to a scheme of 'ordered liberty' and prerequisite to
social justice and peace."'4" Thus, even assuming the existence of a con-
stitutional right to refuse antipsychotic medication, the state interests
4For psychiatric patients, the police premise, which is the dangerous potential
for violence thought to be common to all unmedicated psychotic patients, has
been contradicted by psychiatric research. Two hospitals that were required to
implement rules including a limited right to refuse antipsychotic medication did
not see any significant increase in violent incidents. See Note, supra note 6, at
1741 n.185.
42 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
'I United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
"The right to refuse treatment that involves antipsychotic drugs has been
based on the right to privacy, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment, the right to mental and bodily integrity, and substantive due process. See,
e.g., Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1973) (the integrity of one's
mental processes); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F.Supp. 915, 929-30 (N.D. Ohio 1980)
(substantive due process affords right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic
drugs); Souder v. McGuire, 423 F.Supp. 830, 832 (M.D. Pa. 1976) (cruel and
unusual punishment and the right to privacy); In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744, 748 n.8(D.C. 1979) (privacy interests, citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and in-
tegrity of mental processes, citing Mackey).
397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan, J. concurring).
SId.
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in competency in order that a trial may take place may count as suffi-
ciently compelling to outweigh the defendant's liberty or privacy interest
in avoiding forcible medication. 47 The state's compelling interest in the
integrity of its criminal justice system is what sets the right to refuse in
the trial situation apart from the right to refuse in the mental health
care situation; in the former, the beneficiary of the policy to medicate is
seen as being the state, whereas in the latter, public policy is more con-
cerned with the welfare of the committed patient or convict. Ensuring
that a defendant is competent, albeit through coerced medication, en-
hances the integrity of the criminal justice system by placing a primary
emphasis on the accuracy of the trial.4 The goal of accuracy requires that
a defendant have a rational understanding of the proceedings against
him in order that he may be able to evaluate what facts are relevant to
the proof of his innocence. 49 As the Supreme Court succinctly phrased the
matter in Ake v. Oklahoma,50 "[t]he private interest in the accuracy of a
criminal proceeding that places an individual's life or liberty at risk is
almost uniquely compelling.' 51 The state also has a powerful interest in
a trial's accuracy in order to preserve respect for the trial system, espe-
cially where the accused may be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.
52
47 In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26-27 (1905), the Court upheld
compulsory vaccination to prevent epidemics over the petitioner's due process
claim that such a requirement was hostile to the inherent right of the individual
to care for his own body and health in such way as would seem best to him. The
Jacobson opinion, while admitting that there is a sphere within which the in-
dividual may assert the supremacy of his own will and rightfully dispute the
authority of any human government to interfere with the exercise of that will,
still found that:
The liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States .... does not
import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all cir-
cumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to
which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. ... The
possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such reasonable con-
ditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential
to the safety, health, peace, good order, and morals of the community. Even
liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted ... It is ...
liberty regulated by law.
Id. at 26-7; see also Winick, supra note 5, at 812 n.238.
'
8 Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARv. L. REv. 454 (1967). Unfortu-
nately, for purposes of constitutional analysis, cases and commentary tend to
make the assumption that the state's substantial interest in trying an accused
is compelling, while they fail to question what makes that interest compelling
as opposed to merely important. Perhaps the compelling nature of the interest
in trying an accused should vary with the crime. For example, an accused mur-
derer could be forcibly medicated to stand trial but not an embezzler. In order to
prevent the government from forcibly medicating one accused of a minor offense,
a clearer examination of what makes the interest in trying those accused of
breaking its laws compelling is extremely important.
49 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
50 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
561 d. at 78.52 Because this Note discusses the issue of forcing a mentally ill defendant to
attain the Dusky standard of competence for trial through the use of antipsychotic
drugs, the issue of forced drugging to control misbehavior to protect the dignity
and decorum of the trial is beyond the scope of the present discussion.
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It is also possible that by not recognizing a right to refuse antipsychotic
drugs used to achieve trial competency (other than experimental or un-
reasonably risky ones), the Mental Health Standards sought to avoid the
abuse by criminal defendants of the competency process. At one time, a
defendant found mentally incompetent to stand trial was committed to a
mental hospital or treatment facility until it was determined that he had
attained the capacity to proceed. If the requisite capacity was never at-
tained, the commitment had the equivalent effect of a life sentence.5 3 In
the 1972 Supreme Court decision of Jackson v. Indiana,- which has been
described as the most important mental health care case decided in the
1970's,5 5 the old regimen of committing incompetent criminal defendants
was laid to rest. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Blackmun,
the Court held that the indefinite commitment of a mentally incompetent
criminal defendant violated the constitutional principles of equal protec-
tion and due process.5 Substantive due process requires that both the
duration and nature of confinement for incompetency bear a reasonable
relation to its purpose. The Court said in Jackson that a criminal de-
fendant who is committed because of his inability to meet the Dusky
standard of competence for trial cannot be held more than the period
needed to determine whether there is "a substantial probability that he
will attain the capacity in the foreseeable future. '57 If it is determined
that there is a probability the defendant will soon be able to proceed, his
continued commitment needs to be justified by progress toward achieving
competence for trial. Incompetent defendants for whom there is no sub-
stantial probability of a restoration to Dusky competency in the foresee-
able future are either to be released or committed under civil commitment
statutes.58
In the aftermath of Jackson, it became increasingly attractive for in-
competent criminal defendants, especially those with serious felony
See Engelberg, Pre-Trial Criminal Commitment to Mental Institutions: The
Procedure in Massachusetts and Suggested Reform, 17 CATH. U. L. REv. 163, 165(1967) (twenty-four year old man charged with vagrancy committed as incom-
petent until his death sixty-three years later); Hess & Thomas, Incompetence to
Stand Trial: Procedures, Results and Problems, 119 Am. J. PSYCH. 713, 716 (1963)(man accused of gross indecency in 1926 still hospitalized as incompetent in 1963);
Parker, California's New Scheme for the Commitment of Individuals Found In-
competent to Stand Trial, 6 PAC. L. J. 484, 485 (1975); see also Note, supra note
48.
" 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
-5 See Steadman, supra note 7, at 329.
406 U.S. at 723-39.
Id. at 738.
Id. At least one commentator suggested in the aftermath of Jackson that
even an incompetent defendant per the Dusky standard should have the oppor-
tunity to litigate the issue of his guilt and that special procedural rules should
be used to compensate for his incapacities. See Burt & Morris, A Proposal for the
Abolition of the Incompetency Plea, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 66, 85 n.78 (1972). Such a
scheme has impliedly been rejected in MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note
3, at 7-4.10(d) presumably because due process would not be satisfied if the de-
fendant lacks the Dusky ability to relate to the proceedings.
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charges facing lengthy prison terms, to be found permanently incapaci-
tated so as to gain the benefits of Jackson.59 Frequently, the charges
against those deemed permanently incapacitated were dismissed;60 al-
ternately, such defendants were processed under state civil commitment
statutes with more liberal release standards than a criminal sentence. 61
It is therefore not surprising that after Jackson one district court judge
wrote that he was aware of many criminal cases where the defendants
made apparently miraculous recoveries after pending criminal charges
were dropped because of a determination that the defendant would not
soon regain competency to be tried. 2 The post-Jackson abuses of the
incompetency doctrine moved one commentator to advocate abandonment
of the automatic bar doctrine in those jurisdictions which used the doc-
trine to invalidate any drug-induced competency as being "synthetic" and
not genuine.63 The same abuse avoidance argument could be equally
applied to the rejection of the right to refuse antipsychotic drugs to gain
Dusky competence for trial as promulgated by the Mental Health Stand-
ards.
The discussion so far of the possible policy rationales underlying the
weakness of the right to refuse recognized by the Mental Health Standards
in the case of incompetent detainees would be remiss if it did not point
out that the ABA guidelines fail to address the great dangerousness of
antipsychotic drugs in general6 and do not define what constitutes an
"unreasonable risk of serious, hazardous, or irreversible side effects. '6 5
Less intrusive means of attaining competence for trial, such as verbal
psychotherapy or behavior modification techniques, 66 are possible alter-
natives that might support a defendant's decision to refuse the more
intrusive and potentially dangerous drug therapy. Less intrusive methods
of achieving competency to stand trial may not be as efficient or even as
effective as antipsychotic medication; however, if there is some consti-
tutional right to refuse antipsychotic medication, the state's admittedly
strong interests in trying criminal defendants may be met with less than
the most efficient means for achieving competency to stand trial.67
An issue inherently related to the right to refuse antipsychotic medi-
cation to induce competence is whether a defendant has a right to be
19 See Winick, supra note 5, at 792.
"Id.
61 Id.62United States v. Lancaster, 408 F.Supp. 225, 229 (D.D.C. 1976).
See Winick, supra note 5, at 792.
See generally Antipsychotic Medication, supra note 1.
MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 7-4.10(d).
"Such techniques, while perhaps less effective than medication in treating
the typical psychiatric disorders resulting in trial incapacity, are clearly less
intrusive than drug therapy.
67 The Mental Health Standards emphasis that the treatment be reasonable
and ordinary implies reliance on the "professional judgment" standard of Young-
berg v. Romeo 457 U.S. 307 (1982). The presumption of correctness associated
with this standard may not require recognition of a right to the least intrusive
form of treatment.
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tried in an unmedicated state. The premise behind such a right is that
the jury, which must decide whether a defendant was not responsible for
his criminal offense due to mental illness, is inevitably influenced by how
a defendant looks and acts in court during a trial.68 The medication given
during trial, which may be the sole means by which a psychotic defendant
is able to understand the proceedings against him, may interfere with
the jury's capacity to determine the degree of sanity of the defendant
when the offense was committed. The Mental Health Standards ap-
proaches this issue in a no-nonsense manner. The Standards provide that
if a defendant is only competent to stand trial with the aid of medication,
he has the right to tell the jury that he is on medication and what effect
the drugs may have on his demeanor; there is not right to actually appear
before the jury in an unmedicated state.69 Although the use of instructions
to the jury to ignore what they have observed is subject to debate as to
effectiveness, 70 the Mental Health Standards accepts their use to enable
jurors to assess accurately a defendant's unmedicated mental state despite
the altered appearance and demeanor in the courtroom. In the case of a
defendant who has asserted mental irresponsibility, however, it is just as
likely that a jury may view the medicated state of the defendant as the
defendant's normal state and thereby discount the claim of irresponsi-
bility." In addition, a jury may legitimately question the credibility of a
defendant whose demeanor, through the use of medication, has been ren-
dered inappropriate to the occasion; a defendant whose emotions are
dulled or whose responses are not appropriate to the emotional message
See, e.g., In re Pray, 133 Vt. 253, 257-58, 336 A.2d 174, 177 (1975). There is
a risk that the defendant's condition at trial under medication would mislead thejury and prevent a fair trial.
MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 7-4.14 states:(a) A defendant should not be considered incompetent to stand trial because
the defendant's present mental competence is dependent upon continuation
of treatment or habilitation which includes medication, nor should a de-
fendant be prohibited from standing trial or entering a plea solely because
that defendant is being provided such services under professional super-
vision.
(b) If the defendant proceeds to trial with the aid of treatment or habilitation
which may affect demeanor, either party should have the right to introduce
evidence regarding the treatment or habilitation and its effects and the
jury should be instructed accordingly.
This rule effectively abandons the automatic bar rule to "synthetic" compe-
tency, and is concerned only with the issue of triability and not the source of the
present mental competence. This Note assumes that the issue of appearing before
the jury in an unmedicated state was purposely omitted from the Mental Health
Standards; it is also possible that its absence was an oversight or that the drafters
had not discussed or arrived at a conclusion on this point.
7o See, e.g., Allen, When Jurors Are Ordered to Ignore Testimony, They Ignore
the Order, Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1988, at B2, col. 3.
71 Slovenko, The Developing Law on Competency to Stand Trial, 5 J. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 165, 182 (1977).
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conveyed by his testimony may create a false impression that he is lying.72
Thus, the Mental Health Standards recognizes neither a right for in-
competent detainees to refuse antipsychotic drugs administered to induce
Dusky competence to stand trial nor a due process right to be tried in a
non-medicated state; this position finds some support in certain case law.
In the 1978 case, State v. Hayes,7 a defendant whose competence to stand
trial was dependent upon treatment with antipsychotic drugs claimed a
right to be tried in his unmedicated state. The New Hampshire Supreme
Court ruled that the defendant lacked an absolute right to be tried free
from the influence of drugs and would be compelled to be under medication
for at least four weeks prior to the trial provided that the jury was in-
structed of these facts.7 4 The Hayes court emphasized that antipsychotic
drugs did not affect the process or content of the defendant's thoughts,
but rather "allowed the cognitive part of the defendant's brain, which
had been altered by the mental disease, to come back into play.' 75 The
court would not look beyond existing competency; the fact that it is syn-
thetically induced is of no concern to the issue of triability.76 It is inter-
esting to note that, unlike the Mental Health Standards, the Hayes
decision held that if the defendant so requests, he is entitled to be viewed
by the jury after a period of non-medication equal to the length of time
that he was drug-free at the time of the crime.7 7 It is not clear from the
Hayes opinion whether this limited right to appear in an unmedicated
state is a due process entitlement to help the defendant assert an insanity
12 This criticism may be countered by comparison with a psychotic individual
who commits a crime and recovers by the time of trial, without the benefit of
medication. The jury will not be observing the individual in the same state as at
the time of the crime. In spite of the defendant's altered trial demeanor, the jury
is expected to attempt to conceptualize the accused as he was at the time of the
crime in order to assess whether he was then insane. However, due process may
require more (e.g., a tape of the defendant in his unmedicated state) where it is
the state which is inducing or creating the altered demeanor. In State v. Maryott,
6 Wash. App. 96, 492 P.2d 239 (1971), a Washington court of appeals denied the
state the ability to erase through medication "the major contours of the demeanor,
appearance, and attitude of a defendant who is pleading his mental condition and
then explain to the jury what they have, in effect, chosen for the jurors not to
see." Id. at 99, 492 P.2d at 243.
1- 118 N.H. 458, 389 A.2d 1379 (1978).74 Id. at 462, 389 A.2d at 1381.
'5 Id. This suggests that if antipsychotic drugs were shown to affect cognition,
their use on a criminal defendant would be impermissible as a manifestation of
the law's revulsion against state control over men's minds. See Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557, 565 (1967) ("Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought
of giving government the power to control men's minds").
76 See State v. Hampton, 253 La. 399, 218 So. 2d 311 (1969).
77 118 N.H. at 463, 389 A.2d at 1382. The time at which the jury is to view
the defendant after he has stopped medication is a matter for the trial court to
determine based on the evidence before it. Before committing his crime, Hayes
had been taking Stelazine, Artane, and Valium but stopped the day before the
crime. He was therefore held entitled to have the jury view him in a state as free
from the effects of medication as he would have been after one unmedicated day.
Expert testimony showed that he would have been under the influence of the
medication at the time of the crime.
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defense because simply informing the jury about his medicated status is
an inadequate protection of the right to a fair trial.78 The implication in
Hayes may be that informing jurors of the fact of medication and giving
them a description of the specific side effects of that medication on a
particular defendant may be adequate only where the defendant's de-
meanor is not at issue in the case.79
In State v. Jojola,s° the court of appeals of New Mexico was presented
with a similar issue as the Hayes court. The defendant, who had a long
history of mental illness, was found to be suffering from paranoid schiz-
ophrenia which caused him to feel persecuted by almost everyone with
whom he came in contact.8' The evidence showed that the defendant was
competent to stand trial under Dusky as long as he was medicated with
Thorazine, which was forcibly administered. 82 As in Hayes, the Jojola
court endorsed the coercive use of medication to attain competence, but
only with a drug like Thorazine, whose effect was described as "inhibiting
or depressing the emotional part of the brain" but permitting the cognitive
functions to make decisions and communicate with others.83 While the
defendant did not contest that the medication made him competent to
stand trial, he nevertheless asserted a right to be tried free from the
influence of Thorazine.8 ' In pretrial hearings, Jojola stated an intention
to show that children in his neighborhood made up stories about him and
that the crime for which he was being prosecuted was one of these stories
which had gotten out of hand. Therefore, his demeanor at trial would be
relevant to the issue of whether. the jury would believe that such stories
could have been fabricated about him.m Since this theory was not pursued
at trial, the Jojola court did not reach the issue of whether it would be
an appropriate or necessary protection of due process to show the jury an
unmedicated defendant. It was enough to afford the defense an oppor-
tunity to inform the jury as to the facts of Thorazine medication and its
78 Unfortunately, the Hayes opinion offers no analysis of its assumption that
the defendant has no right to refuse antipsychotic medication.
79 The MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 7-4.14(b) makes no pro-
vision for viewing a defendant in an unmedicated state, whether or not demeanor
is an issue at trial and even if it is evident that the defendant was not medicated
when the crime took place.
80 89 N.M. 489, 553 P.2d 1296 (1976).
81 Id. at 491, 553 P.2d at 1298.
8 Id.
81 See supra note 75. As in Hayes, the Jojola ruling failed to discuss the reasons
for its assumption that a mentally ill criminal defendant may be forcibly drugged
to stand trial.
8 Thorazine has the effect of sedating and producing a calmer demeanor. Jojola
was being tried on two counts of aggravated sodomy.
89 N.M. at 493, 553 P.2d at 1300. One wonders why the defense counsel
pursued this argument. Though an agitated appearance might lend credibility to
the claim that children had made up stories about him, nonetheless a more refined
demeanor would probably make it harder for a jury to believe that he had been
the perpetrator of such a violent crime.
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effects upon the defendant.8 While Jojola may be cited to show that a
mentally ill criminal defendant may be forced to attain drug induced
competence and has no right to be tried in an unmedicated state, it is
unclear from the case whether more is required than informing the jury
about the defendant's "synthetic" competence where the defendant's de-
meanor is truly an issue in the case.
8 7
In State v. Law," the supreme court of South Carolina was confronted
with a defendant who claimed that he could not be medicated against his
will to achieve Dusky competence and that it was unlawful to try him
while he was under the influence of antipsychotic medication. The Law
court held that antipsychotic medication may be administered without
the consent of a defendant under compelling circumstances, such as where
the medication is necessary to render a defendant competent to stand
trial.8 ' Law also held that since the jury was informed through testimony
16 No effort was actually made by the defense to inform the jury that Jojola
was on Thorazine treatment; this omission may have been interpreted by the
New Mexico court of appeals as indicating a lack of seriousness on the part of
the defense concerning the demeanor argument. Id.
87 The Jojola court relied on both the fact that the defense had the opportunity
to inform the jury about the Thorazine treatment, even though it chose not to,
and the failure to pursue the "made up stories" theory at trial to conclude that
due process had not been violated. The appropriateness of telling the jury that
the defendant's demeanor has been medically altered is not without controversy.
Compare State v. Gwaltney, 77 Wash. 2d 906, 468 P.2d 433 (1970) ("It is not a
fact of which a judge or jury cannot be appropriately and effectively advised")
with Commonwealth v. Louraine, 390 Mass. 28, 33, 453 N.E.2d 442 (1983) ("It
cannot compensate for the positive value to the defendant's case of his own de-
meanor in an unmedicated condition.").
270 S.C. 664, 244 S.E.2d 302 (1978).
8 Id. at 669, 244 S.E.2d at 307. The court cited Justice Brennan's concurring
opinion in Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) to show that the safeguards which
the Constitution has been found to accord criminal defendants presupposes a
compelling governmental interest in trying people who have been accused of
violating valid laws. Law also relied upon State v. Hampton, 253 La. 399, 218
So. 2d 311 (1969) to provide legal precedent for a right to coerce medication. In
Hampton, where modern American case law concerning the use of antipsychotic
drugs to make a criminal defendant triable begins, as defendant who did not meet
the Dusky standard persuaded the court to permit her to be tried while taking
Thorazine. A state sanity commission had found that while under treatment
Hampton had a present capacity to understand the proceedings and assist in her
defense; the court held that the fact that this capacity was produced by anti-
psychotic medication was of "no legal consequence." Id. at 403, 218 So. 2d at 312.
Hampton is viewed as establishing the proposition that the state has no interest
in preventing the trial of a defendant who by taking medication could meet
competency standards for trial; the court would "not look beyond existing com-
petency and erase improvement produced by medical science." Id. The connection
between the Hampton rejection of the automatic bar rule, which had excluded
the acceptance of drug-induced competence as synthetic mind control, and the
conclusion that the state may compel an unfit defendant to take antipsychotic
drugs is not a logically necessary one. Read literally, Hampton only affilrmed that
the fitness to stand trial standard should be a current ability to function per
Dusky and held that the fact that Hampton was only "synthetically sane" con-
stituted no fraud upon the court. From the fact that the state has no interest in
preventing treatment does not necessarily follow the conclusion that treatment
may be compelled; however, Law seems to have reached precisely this conclusion.
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about the defendant's mental history and present condition and knew
that his claim demeanor at trial was the result of medication, the insanity
defense was not undermined."
In United States v. Charters,91 the fourth circuit court concluded that
a mentally ill pretrial detainee may be administered antipsychotic drugs
against his will in order to maintain his competency to stand trial. Al-
though the Charters court did not analyze why the government's position
to forcibly medicate to obtain competency was stronger than the private
interest to avoid bodily intrusion, it did characterize Charters' interest
in freedom from bodily intrusion as only deserving protection against
arbitrary and capricious government action.9 2 The defendant in Charters,
who had been arrested for threatening to kill President Reagan, main-
tained that his interest against being medicated involuntarily could be
adequately protected only if a judicial hearing were required to determine
whether he was competent enough to decide whether to accept the med-
ication. The defendant continued that if he was found competent, his
right to refuse should be honored. If found incompetent, the court could
then make a substituted judicial judgment of the inmate's best interests.9 3
The Charters court rejected the defendant's proposal as being far beyond
what due process requires. The court cited Youngberg v. Romeo,9 4 which
held that decisions of treatment professionals should be treated by courts
as presumptively valid and inherently nonarbitrary unless greatly di-
vergent from industry standards. 95 Since the Charters decision dealt solely
with the issue of forced medication at the pretrial stage, it never reached
the issue of what safeguards adequately protect the defendant's due proc-
ess rights during the trial, e.g., whether informing the jury that the
defendant is medicated is enough."
The Charters opinion is noteworthy because it assumes that a defendant
who is mentally incompetent to stand trial cannot reasonably be judicially
90 In addition, it was emphasized to the jury that it was Law's mental state at
the time of the murder and robbery that governed whether he was criminally
responsible. 270 S.C. at 672, 244 S.E.2d at 306.
11 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988).
92 Id. at 308.
93Id. at 307. Interestingly, no suggestion was made to have decisions made by
next of kin. The proposal would have cast district judges in the role of making
medical and psychiatric decisions rather than reviewing the decisions of medical
professionals. It is not surprising that the Charters court felt uncomfortable with
such a regime and therefore rejected it. Of course, there is no reason to assume
a medical diagnosis is more fallible than the comparable judicial diagnosis. See
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (base-line decisions to medicate should be
made by medical professionals, subject to judicial review for arbitrariness).
457 U.S. 307 (1982).
Charters was an involuntarily-committed psychiatric patient at the Federal
Correctional Institution at Butner, North Carolina. As such, the decision to med-
icate him to maintain competence was based on the professional judgment of the
government physicians at Butner.
" There is no reported case, to this author's knowledge, that deals with the
issue of whether the jury has to be told that the defendant's current medicated
state was induced against his will, rather than voluntarily.
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declared competent to determine his own best interests in receiving or
refusing medication. "While in theory there may be a difference between
the two mental states, it must certainly be one of such subtlety and
complexity as to tax perception by the most skilled medical or psychiatric
professionals.."97 The court also held that the recognized potential of dan-
gerous side effects from antipsychotic medication did not warrant the
higher level of due process protection requested by the patient. This con-
clusion was based on the premise that if the side effects were consistently
probable and severe, then antipsychotic medication should never be ad-
ministered, even upon consent.98 In effect, Charters stands for the premise
that a mentally ill pretrial detainee is afforded no more than the right
to ensure that his treatment is managed by a medical professional whose
judgment is within the accepted standards of the medical profession.
Under this standard, the question presented by a judicial challenge such
as Charters: is not whether the treatment decision is demanded by the
government's interest in trying those accused of violating its laws or even
whether the decision to medicate was medically the most appropriate
choice to maintain competence. All that is of consequence is whether the
decision was made by a professional who has the knowledge to make such
decisions through education, training, or experience," in a nonarbitrary
manner. 10
9 Charters, 863 F.2d at 310. The dissent took issue with this contention and
questioned the fairness of delegating the medication decision to a government
medical official who may be inclined to agree with the federal prosecutor on the
desirability of a trial proceeding and a resulting conviction. Id. at 315. The dis-
tinction between incompetence to stand trial or function in society and the ability
to decide that one dislikes certain medication is accepted by many right to refuse
cases that deal with involuntary civil commitment. See infra notes 128-132 and
accompanying text. Even Law, Jojola, and Hayes failed to question the ability of
a mentally ill defendant to intelligently refuse antispychotic drugs; these cases
only held that a defendant has no constitutional right to refuse or that the right
must fall aside to the government interests in forcing competency to stand trial.
See generally Note, supra note 7. One commentator observed that equating mental
illness with legal incompetence is naive. See Fentinman, Whose Right Is It Any-
way?: Rethinking Competency to Stand Trial in Light of the Synthetically Sane
Insanity Defendant, 40 U. MLAM L. REv. 1109 (1986).
Charters, 863 F.2d at 311. Beginning with Hampton, "synthetic" competence
has not only been tolerated in order to allow a trial to proceed, but has been
encouraged where a defendant would otherwise be untriable. See Bee v. Greaves,
744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984).
" Romeo, 457 U.S. at 323 n.30.
100 The amicus brief for Charters by the American Psychological Association
indicated that the substantial risk of deleterious side effects from antipsychotic
medication made it more attractive to risk errors of incompetent judgment by a
mental patient in declining medication than to risk the possible errors of profes-
sional misjudgment. This stance is reflective of the traditional psychodynamic
model of mental illness which rejects the superiority of organic treatments over
verbal psychotherapy. The amicus brief of the American Psychiatric Association
supported the government's position by downplaying the incidence of substantial
side effects to antipsychotic medication and describing how dangerous side effects
such as tardive dyskinesia can be adequately managed medically. The APA ami-
cus is apparently reflective of the belief of many in the psychiatric profession that
heredity and biochemical imbalances are usually the main contributing factors
in psychiatric disorders and need to be treated chemically, not verbally. Charters,
863 F.2d at 311 n.6.
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Hayes, Jojola, Law, and Charters recognized the competency-restoring
qualities of antipsychotic drugs and held that a mentally ill defendant
had no right to refuse them where his competency to stand trial was at
issue. Furthermore, Jojola and Law failed to recognize a due process right
to be tried while in an unmedicated state. However, it does not necessarily
follow that since the state's interests may be compelling enough to support
forcible medication and deny the right to be tried without medication,
that the state may also prevent a defendant from being observed by a
jury at some time during trial in an unmedicated state. Such a simple
due process device is especially warranted where the evidence indicates
that a defendant was unaffected by medication at the time of the alleged
crime. Hayes, where the right to refuse was rejected, nonetheless ac-
knowledged that the defendant may request to be viewed without med-
ication. 1" Thus, while the Mental Health Standards' position not to
recognize a right to refuse antipsychotic drugs that would make a de-
fendant competent to stand trial finds ample support in the case law and
in the psychiatric profession, 10 2 its position that due process does not
require that the jury see the defendant unmedicated at some point during
trial (especially where insanity is claimed as the defense) 03 finds little
support in the case law. In addition, it also does not follow from the
compelling nature of the government's interest in upholding the dignity
of the criminal justice system.
In assuming that a mentally incompetent defendant is currently
required' to undergo treatment to achieve a mental state compatible
with triability and is not entitled to present his unmedicated demeanor
to the jury, the Mental Health Standards impliedly denies an incompetent
detainee the right to waive being tried while competent. Theoretically, a
defendant, at least after being restored to competence by medication, can
assert a right to discontinue drugs and thereby waive in advance whatever
due process right may exist in order not to be tried while incompetent. 05
101 See also In re Pray, 133 Vt. 253, 336 A.2d 174 (1975).
102 Supra note 100.
103The prejudicial effect of an unusually calm demeanor is of greatest concern
when the defendant presents the defense of insanity. See State v. Murphy, 56
Wash. 2d 761, 355 P.2d 323 (1960) (new trial ordered for defendant given death
penalty for murder; ingestion of tranquilizers prior to his testimony may have
made defendant seem less remorseful and more calculating than he would other-
wise have appeared). See also Bennett, A Guided Tour Through Selected ABA
Standards Relating to Incompetence to Stand Trial, 53 GEo. WASH L. REv. 375
(1985).
- SeeMENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 7-4.10(d) and commentary
at 223.
101 See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text. The defendant's right to be
present at trial is not absolute. Like many procedural trial rights, it may be
voluntarily waived. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,106 (1984) (dictum);
Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455-59 (1912). See also Taylor v. United
States, 414 U.S. 17, 20 (1973) (upholding constitutionality of provision of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allowing voluntary waiver of the defendant's
right to be present). The defendant may also waive the right to be present by
behaving in a manner that is "so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the
court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom." Illinois v.
Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970).
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In People v. Rogers,106 a California appellate court held that a defendant
may waive the right to be present at trial by using medication with the
intent of inducing incompetency.0 7 Rogers, a diabetic, injected a large
dose of insulin on the fourth day of his trial and willfully abstained from
eating a sufficient breakfast. 10 8 Thus, the defendant had by his own actions
impaired his mental state to the extent that he was not competent for
trial; nevertheless, the state interest in having a competent defendant to
insure the dignity of the criminal process was not invoked to invalidate
the defendant's waiver of competency. 10 9
In State v. Hayes,110 the supreme court of New Hampshire, while re-
cognizing the right of the state to coerce a defendant to take antipsychotic
drugs to attain competency for trial, also held that if the defendant by
his own voluntary choice, became incompetent to stand trial because of
a refusal to take medication, he would be deemed to have waived the
right to be tried while competent."' The Hayes court required that the
court carefully examine the defendant on the record while competent, to
establish:
that the defendant understands that if he is taken off the psy-
chotropic medication he may become legally incompetent to
stand trial; that he understands that he has a constitutional
right not to be tried while legally incompetent; that the de-
fendant voluntarily gives up this right by requesting that he
be taken off the psychotropic medication; and that he under-
stands that the trial will continue whatever his condition may
be.112
The Massachusetts supreme court, in the 1983 case of Commonwealth
v. Louraine,"3 held that a mentally ill defendant in a homicide case had
a right to be tried in an unmedicated state. The court considered the
drug's effect on the defendant's demeanor where sanity at the time of the
offense is an issue and held that if the defendant is willing to waive being
tried while competent in order to present his real demeanor to the jury,
he has the right to do so."
4
10 150 Cal. App. 2d 403, 309 P.2d 949 (1957).
o10 Id. at 415, 309 P.2d at 957.
]-4 Id. at 409, 413, 309 P.2d at 953, 955. As a result, he experienced insulin
shock and could not assist in his defense.
'
0 9 The court's concern in Rogers was whether the defendant's right to be pres-
ent at trial was violated, not the state's interest in having a competent defendant.
If the waiver of presence is accepted, the trial continues without the accused.
0o 118 N.H. 458, 389 A.2d 1379 (1978).
"I Id. at 462, 389 A.2d at 1382. Presumably, Hayes wanted to present his true
demeanor to the jury.
112 Id.
13 390 Mass. 28, 453 N.E.2d 437 (1983).
114 Id. at 38 n.13, 453 N.E.2d at 444 n.13. See also Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284, 302-03 (1973); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
"5 See Note, supra note 48, at 457-58. The interest in appearing free of the
medication's effects may also benefit the prosecution in that it permits the accused
to show off his "mad dog" side. See Bennett, supra note 103, at 410 n.190.
[Vol. 4:2
A NEW TWIST IN THE WAR ON DRUGS
The rejection by the Mental Health Standards of the right of a mentally
ill criminal defendant to be tried while incompetent, through waiver of
his constitutional right to be present, may be explained as an assertion
of the state's interest in the accuracy, dignity, and apparent fairness of
the criminal process. 15 However, not allowing the appearance of the nat-
ural demeanor of a defendant at some point during the trial in the interest
ofjudicial fairness is indeed difficult to justify. If in fact the Mental Health
Standards position that the state may forcibly medicate to attain trial
competency is meant to apply to a pretrial detainee, an inconsistency
may exist between the denial of the right to refuse prior to trial with the
recognition of such a right by a convicted prisoner."6
IV. THE ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING A RIGHT TO REFUSE ANTIPSYCHOTIC
MEDICATION EVEN WHERE THE MEDICATION RESULTS IN COMPETENCY
TO STAND TRIAL
An early reported case that held that a defendant may not be forced
against his will to take drugs in order to attain competence to stand trial
is the 1971 case of State v. Maryott,117 in which the Washington court of
appeals was asked to decide whether the state had a right, over the defense
counsel's objection, to administer drugs which affect the defendant's men-
tal and/or physical abilities at the time of trial; and particularly, whether
the state may do so where the defendant's mental responsibility to commit
the crime is at issue." 8 The Maryott court held that the state
was prohibited from forcing the drugs upon the defendant in either sit-
uation because no state interest could justify such intrusive and total
control over an accused." 9 While it may be inferred from the court's
opinion that the medication was not administered to enhance mental
competence to stand trial, but to control possible courtroom misbehav-
ior,1 20 thus distinguishing the opinion from the Mental Health Standards'
right to forcibly drug to attain Dusky competence, the due process ar-
gument used in the Maryott opinion may have cogent force even where
the goal is to produce a triable defendant. In holding that Maryott's due
process rights had been violated, the court looked to several cases which
held that defendants could not be chained or shackled in court since doing
so would subject them to physical pain. "To apply the historical concerns
116 MENTAL HEALTH STANmms, supra note 3, at 7-10.9. See also Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979) (pretrial detainees "retain at least those constitutional
rights that we have held are enjoyed by convicted prisoners").
" 6 Wash. App. 96, 492 P.2d 239 (1971). See generally Silten & Tullis, Mental
Competency in Criminal Proceedings, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1053, 1054 (1977).
I8 Maryott, 6 Wash. App. at 97, 492 P.2d at 240.
119 Id.
120 It is not clear from the case why Maryott was administered antipsychotic
medication, Id. at 105, 492 P.2d at 243.
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about shackling to cases involving drugs, which may have the same or
more deleterious effects, is only to give a more current application to a
basic concern.'
21
In addition to expressing a concern that Maryott's due process rights
may.have been violated by the physical effects of the drugs on him, the
court held that a separate due process issue was also implicated; that
through the administration of antipsychotic drugs, the state was in effect
choosing for the jurors exactly which demeanor of the defendant would
be available for viewing. 22 If, for example, a defendant were to appear
at his trial in prison clothing, the jury may or may not tend to be prej-
udiced against him. Where such prejudice is possible, however, the Su-
preme Court has held that the state cannot compel a defendant to wear
such attire. 123 A defendant in shackles or prison stripes presents a dif-
ferent persona to the jury than a defendant in a business suit. The same
may be said of treatment with antipsychotic drugs. Although the drugged
defendant's altered demeanor may have no prejudicial effect on the jury,
the point of Maryott's analogy to the chaining and shackling cases, along
with the Supreme Court's decision regarding prison garb, may be that
the state may not coerce a defendant into a position of even potential
prejudice.124
Some of the right to refuse cases in the civil commitment and post
criminal conviction areas shed light on the assertable interests that an
accused may have to attempt to halt the forcible administration of an-
tipsychotic medication to attain competence to stand trial. In Davis v.
Hubbard,125 which involved a challenge of the conditions at a state mental
institution, the court probed the historical basis of the right to refuse
unwanted medical treatments and pointed out that the law of torts has
long recognized a person's interest in making decisions about his body.126
The Davis court concluded that the forced use of antipsychotic drugs
represents a significant invasion of an individual's fundamental right to
privacy.127 The court also held that there is no necessary relationship
121 Id. at 100, 492 P.2d at 242. For discussion of the painful side effects of
antipsychotic medication see generally Winick, Incompetency to Stand Trial: An
Assessment of Costs and Benefits And A Proposal For Reform, 39 RUTGERS L. REv.
243 (1987) [hereinafter Incompetency to Stand Trial]; Winick, Legal Limitations
on Correctional Therapy and Research, 65 MINN. L. REv. 331, 365 (1981) [here-
inafter Legal Limitations].
'1 Maryott, 6 Wash. App. at 105, 492 P.2d at 243.
123 Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1976); cf. Illinois v. Allen, 397
U.S. 337, 344 (1970) (court removal preferred to binding or gagging disruptive
defendant due to impact "on the jury's feelings about the defendant").
- Maryott never considered the adequacy of telling the jury about the source
of the defendant's altered demeanor as a means of dealing with the due process
considerations.
"25 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
'2 Id. at 931-32.
2 Id. at 929-30; accord Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 843-44, vacated and
remanded for further consideration, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), on remand, 720 F.2d
266 (3d Cir. 1983) (en banc); Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), on remand, 738
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989); Rogers v. Okin, 684 F.2d 650,653-54 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated
and remanded on other grounds sub nom.
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between mental illness and the type of incompetency which would render
a patient unable to provide informed consent to medical treatment.128
Moreover, the Davis decision discussed how the efficacy of antipsychotic
medication depends on the existence of a trusting relationship between
psychiatrist and patient 129 and how such a relationship may be impliedly
absent where a patient/defendant looks to the courts for protection against
unconsented medication. It has been the impression of the trial courts in
several of the right to refuse cases that drug refusals were, for most
patients, motivated by a desire to avoid the drug's unpleasant side
effects'30 or based on a personal appraisal that the drugs were not helping
the patient's condition.' 3' The Davis court found that eighty-five percent
of inpatients were capable of making rational decisions on whether to
consent to the use of antipsychotic medication. 3 2
The conclusion that an individual has a constitutionally protected in-
terest in making his own decisions whether to accept or reject the ad-
ministration of potentially dangerous drugs is supported by the Supreme
Court's decision in Whalen v. Roe.133 Whalen involved an action by phy-
sicians and patients challenging the constitutionality of a statute re-
quiring that New York State be provided with a copy of all prescriptions
for certain drugs. 34 Justice Stevens, writing for a unanimous court, spe-
cifically recognized a privacy interest "in independence in making certain
kinds of important decisions."'3 5 The Davis court implicitly held that the
decision whether to accept treatment with antipsychotic drugs is of suf-
ficient importance to fall within the category of privacy interests recog-
nized by Whalen as protected by the Constitution. 36 Another suggested
basis for the right to refuse antipsychotic drug treatment is the freedom
from bodily restraint interest recognized by the Supreme Court in Young-
berg v. Romeo. 37 In Romeo, a severely retarded man who had been in-
voluntarily committed to a mental institution was subjected to physical
M Davis, 506 F. Supp. at 935. This distinction gives weight to the principle
that one may be incompetent to stand trial, but competent to make treatment
decisions. Professor Brooks has pointed out that medication refusal is often an
"amalgam of rational and irrational reasons, mental illness and non-mental ill-
ness induced." See Brooks, supra note 1, at 209.
' Davis, 506 F. Supv. at 936.
'
3o See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1140 (1978).
131 See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1305 (1981).
e'2 Davis, 506 F. Supp. at 927. Of the 15% incapable of making such decisions,
few have been found to be incapable by a neutral party. Rather, an often biased
treating staff makes this determination. Id. at n.8.
133 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
34 Id.
"'5 Id. at 599-600 (non-disclosure of personal matters; independence in decision-
making).
'3 As with all fundamental interests, this decision may be validly waived only
if the waiver is voluntary, knowing, intelligent, and done with "sufficient aware-
ness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
U- 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
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soft restraints. The Court stated that the liberty interest from bodily
restraint even survives criminal conviction and incarceration. 138 If in-
carcerated individuals retain a liberty interest in freedom from bodily
restraints of the kind in Romeo, then they certainly have a liberty interest
in freedom from physical and mental restraints of the kind potentially
imposed by antipsychotic drugs. 3 9 By extension, if imprisoned convicts
enjoy a right to refuse antipsychotic treatment, an accused awaiting trial
who has a presumption of legal innocence should certainly have at least
the same protection against liberty deprivation.
Although Romeo may provide a basis for the right to refuse, this Note
has previously indicated that the effect of the protection afforded in the
Court's opinion, professional medical judgment which is presumptively
valid, has reduced the right from a judicial hearing to a right to a second
opinion.1'40 However, the appropriateness of using Romeo's professional
judgment standard in the context of potentially dangerous medication
forced upon a patient or accused awaiting trial is not altogether clear.14 '
Romeo is distinguishable both because it involved temporary physical
restraints rather than mental restraints with potentially long term
effects 142 and because Romeo had been certified as severely retarded and
unable to care for himself, as opposed to involuntarily committed indi-
viduals and to the accused awaiting trial, who are presumed capable of
refusing drugs.' Romeo's impact may be reflected by the absence of any
provision in the Mental Health Standards for a determination of whether
an accused awaiting trial is incapable of expressing an understanding of
the advantages and disadvantages of accepting antipsychotic drugs and
the alternatives to accepting the particular treatment offered, after the
advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives have been explained. The
Romeo decision is also significant in that the Court declined to apply a
"less intrusive means" analysis to a decision regarding treatment of an
involuntarily committed mental patient. Similarly, the Mental Health
Standards lacks a requirement of such analysis where triability is the
goal sought.144
3 Id. at 316.
- See Project Release v. Prevost, 551 F. Supp. 1298, 1309 (E.D.N.Y. 1982),
affd, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983).
'4 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
' The Court obviously held this standard was relevant to the patient context
since it remanded Rennie, 720 F.2d at 266 (3d Cir. 1983) to the United States
court of appeals for the third circuit for further consideration in light of Romeo.
14, Antipsychotic drugs are an arguably greater and possibly irreversible in-
fringement on the liberty interest at stake. See Rennie, 720 F.2d at 274-77.
- Institutional attitudes toward committed patients have changed; in the past,
most state psychiatric patients were generally presumed legally incompetent for
all purposes. This presumption of incompetence has for the most part been re-
versed. See, e.g., State ex. rel. Jones v. Gerhardstein, 141 Wis. 2d 710, 740, 416
N.W.2d 883, 895 (1987).
I" There is a safeguard against the undefined unreasonable risk of serious,
hazardous or irreversible side effects. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 3,
at 7-4.10(d).
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While the Supreme Court opinion in Romeo has been interpreted as
effectively closing the door to a meaningful federal constitutional right
to refuse antipsychotic medications, 145 several leading state courts con-
tinue to insist upon a right to refuse that has some substance. In Rogers
v. Commissioner of Dept. of Mental Health,'146 the supreme court of Mas-
sachusetts held that under state common law, since involuntary com-
mitment is not a determination that the individual is incompetent to
make treatment decisions, such a determination must be made by the
judge before a committed individual can be forcibly administered anti-
psychotic drugs in a non-emergency situation. Rogers held that if an in-
voluntarily committed individual is judicially determined to be incom-
petent to exercise informed consent for the administration of antipsy-
chotic drugs, a guardian should be appointed to monitor treatment.'47 In
Opinion of the Justices,'148 the New Hampshire supreme court interpreted
the state constitution as requiring a prior finding of incompetency with
"procedural protection to the patient" before forcibly giving antipsychotic
medication to involuntarily committed patients. 49
The Colorado supreme court in the 1985 case of People v. Medina, 50
held that under state common law, antipsychotic medication may be ad-
ministered to non-consenting involuntarily committed individuals in non-
emergency situations only after a judicial determination that there is
clear and convincing evidence that the individual is incapable of making
an informed treatment decision. The court also required a finding that
the treatment with antipsychotic drugs is necessary to prevent a signif-
icant and possibly long-term deterioration in the individual's mental con-
dition and in addition, a less intrusive treatment alternative is not
available.' 51 In the 1986 case of Rivers v. Katz, 52 the New York court of
Appeals recognized a state constitution and common law right of invo-
luntarily committed individuals to exercise informed consent for the ad-
ministration of antipsychotic drugs. The court rejected the state's
argument that committed individuals were presumptively incompetent
141 See Antipsychotic Medication, supra note 20, at 367.
140 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983).
"'Id. at 497, 458 N.E.2d at 318. Rogers was a reply to questions that had been
certified to the Supreme Judicial Court by the United States court of appeals for
the first circuit and was the actual resolution of the case considered by the Su-
preme Court in Mill v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
"- 123 N.H. 554, 465 A.2d 484 (1983).
1I Id. at 562, 465 A.2d at 490.
150 705 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1985).
'l 705 P.2d 974. The court also looked at whether the need for treatment is
sufficiently compelling to override any legitimate refusal of such, but did not
indicate what state interests could be compelling, other than patient welfare. The
emphasis in the state right to refuse cases on patient welfare starkly contrasts
with the emphasis on the state's interest and the duties of a mentally ill defendant
in the competency to stand trial cases and the MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra
note 3, at 7-4.10. See Perlin, supra note 19, at 28 n.17.
152 67 N.Y. 2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337 (1986).
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to exercise informed consent and held that the right to consent could only
be overridden after a judicial hearing where a court found that the in-
dividual lacked the capacity to give informed consent and that the benefits
of the antipsychotic drugs to the individual outweighed their possible
adverse effects.153 Part of the significance of the foregoing cases, dealing
with the right of involuntarily committed patients to refuse and the de-
fendant who is incompetent to stand trial, is the following: a mental
patient may disagree with psychiatric judgment that the benefit of med-
ication outweighs the cost and nonetheless remain competent to make
such a decision. Consequently, the decision by an accused awaiting trial
to refuse competency enhancing medication may be entitled to the pre-
sumption of being a capably made decision.
In the 1987 case, State ex. rel. Jones v. Gerhardstein,154 the supreme
court of Wisconsin held that a Wisconsin law which granted the right to
refuse treatment to persons held in pre-commitment detention, but not
to the class of persons actually involuntarily committed, violated equal
protection afforded by the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.'15
After reaffirming the consensus among the civil right-to-refuse decisions
that an involuntary commitment is not equivalent to a finding of incom-
petence with respect to involuntary treatment decisions, 5 6 the Gerhard-
stein court held that a determination of competency to refuse must be
made in an adversarial setting in order to avoid having individuals rou-
tinely declared incompetent for the sake of "mere convenience, control or
expense."1 57 Gerhardstein may be interpreted as suggesting a possible
equal protection challenge to a scheme which ignores the right of a men-
tally ill accused awaiting trial to exercise informed consent, while grant-
ing the right to refuse to a convicted prisoner who is mentally ill.5 a
In 1988, the supreme court of Minnesota, in Jarvis v. Levine, 59 dealt
directly with the relevance of Romeo's professional judgment standard to
the area of forcible medication of the mentally ill. Jarvis explicitly held
that the Supreme Court's decision in Romeo offered little guidance since
it dealt with a patient obviously incapable of giving informed consent 60
and with the issue of freedom from bodily restraint, not the issue of forced
drug treatment and its potentially devastating effects. 16' The Jarvis opin-
ion found the intrusive nature of antipsychotic medication to be acknowl-
15 Id. at 493-94, 495 N.E.2d at 341-42.
154 141 Wis. 2d 710, 416 N.W.2d 883 (1987).
15 Id. at 737, 416 N.W.2d at 892 (court found it unnecessary to determine issue
based on invasion of bodily autonomy).I" d. at 742, 416 N.W.2d at 896.
157 Id. at 744, 416 N.W.2d at 898.
1 Compare MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 7-4.10 (no right to
refuse treatment designed to affect competence to stand trial) with MENTAL
HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 7-10.9 (right of prisoner to refuse treatment).
159 418 N.W.2d 189 (1980).
-o Romeo had the mental capacity of an 18 month-old baby and was obviously
unable to participate in any treatment decisions.
161 Jarvis, 418 N.W.2d at 197.
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edged by even the most vocal supporters of its use as part of a therapeutic
plan.16 2 The court found that the use of antipsychotic medication had to
be subject to the same procedural guidelines as electroconvulsive therapy
(ECT) and psychosurgery.'- The procedure was to include a judicial con-
sideration of the patient's ability to competently determine for himself
whether the treatment is desirable. T6 While acknowledging that it would
be unreasonable for the courts to become involved in every treatment
decision for the mentally ill, Jarvis held, in spite of Romeo, that the
judicial system cannot abdicate all responsibility for protecting a men-
tally ill person's fundamental rights just because some degree of medical
judgment is implicated. 1 5 Special procedures needed to be followed for
psychosurgery, ECT, and antipsychotic drug administration. To deny
mentally ill individuals the right to refuse such intrusive treatments
would "deprive them of basic human dignity by denying their personal
autonomy."' The analogy between ECT and antipsychotic medication
may be highly significant; the Commentary to the Mental Health Stand-
ards admits that ECT may be so intrusive that it may not be forcibly
used to gain competency for trial for a mentally ill criminal defendant.
16 7
In the 1988 case of Harper v. State,'68 which is currently being reviewed
by the United States Supreme Court, the supreme court of Washington
also found that antipsychotic drug treatment is no less intrusive than
ECT and concluded that a judicial hearing is required before the state
may administer antipsychotic drugs to a prisoner against his will.' 69 The
Harper holding that the constitutional liberty interest in refusing ECT
and antipsychotic drug treatmepit survives criminal conviction and in-
carceration as well as civil involuntary commitment may by extension
accord the same right to an accused awaiting trial. Harper provides that
a judicial hearing determines whether there exists a compelling state
interest in administering antipsychotic 'drugs against a prisoner's will
and whether the treatment is necessary and effective. 170 Why isn't there
162 See Gutheil & Appelbaum, "Mind Control," "Synthetic Sanity," "Artificial
Competence," and Genuine Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects of Antipsychotic
Medication, 12 HoFsTRA L. REV. 77, 99-117 (1983). Jarvis acknowledged that the
Supreme Court has not yet directly dealt with the issue of forcible medication of
the mentally ill. Jarvis, 418 N.W.2d at 194.
'
63Jarvis, 418 N.W.2d at 194. See Price v. Sheppard, 307 Minn. 250,239 N.W.2d
905 (1976) (decision to forcibly treat patients with ECT and psychosurgery re-
quired pretreatment judicial review due to severity of potential side effects). See
also supra note 93 and accompanying text.
164 Jarvis, 418 N.W.2d at 194.
'61 Id. at 196.
M Id. at 197.
167 But only if the defense objects! MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 3,
at 7-4.10 and commentary n.2.
110 Wash. 2d 873, 759 P.2d 358 (1988). See supra note 13.
Id. at 881-82, 759 P.2d at 363. See also Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. 415,
421 N.E.2d 40 (1981) (antipsychotic medication should be treated in the same
manner as ECT or psychosurgery).
170 Harper, 110 Wash. 2d at 884, 759 P.2d at 364. For a recent article describing
the state Harper decision and the issues argued in the case before the United
States Supreme Court, see Jost, The Right To Say No, A.B.A.J. 72 (Feb. 1900).
See supra note 13.
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a similar hearing to determine the same information prior to forcibly
administering antipsychotic drugs to attain the competence to become a
convicted prisoner?
Although the right-to-refuse cases differ with respect to how the sit-
uation of a patient/prisoner who is found incompetent to make a treatment
decision should be handled, 171 the cases agree that there is a presumption
of competency to refuse and that the right to refuse, whatever its source,
can only be overcome by a compelling state interest. 7 2 The tenth circuit
court held, in the 1984 case of Bee v. Greaves, 73 that the state of Utah
could not justify forcing a prisoner to take antipsychotic drugs on the
basis of a need to keep a pretrial detainee competent for trial where it
had already been determined that he was not mentally ill and was com-
petent to stand trial. 74 The Bee court doubted whether the state interest
in bringing to trial those accused of a crime could ever be sufficiently
compelling to outweigh a defendant's interest in not being forcibly med-
icated with antipsychotic drugs, even if he is otherwise incompetent to
stand trial. 75 In contrast with the emphasis placed upon the functioning
of the trial system by the Mental Health Standards as warranting forced
medication, the Bee opinion acknowledged the potentially dangerous side
effects of antipsychotic drugs in concluding that the needs of the indi-
vidual and not the requirements of the prosecutor should control when
antipsychotic drugs are considered. 76 The Bee court's conclusion that
antipsychotic drugs could not be employed to attain trial competency was
based upon analogy to the statutory recognition by Utah of the right of
a mentally ill person not to be subjected to involuntary mental treatment
absent a hearing at which the court finds "the patient lacks the ability
to engage in a rational decision-making process regarding the acceptance
of mental treatment as demonstrated by evidence of inability to weigh
the possible costs and benefits of treatment." 7  Bee may therefore stand
for the premise that the right to refuse as a manifestation of personal
dignity and protection against state intrusiveness, which has found ample
expression in the civil commitment cases, is equally appropriate to the
171 Some decisions, such as Harper, provide for judicial substituted judgment.
Others, like Jarvis, allow forcible medication once the issue of competency to
refuse has been judicially reviewed.
171 Whether competency to stand trial is a compelling enough state interest to
outweigh a fundamental liberty right remains to be litigated.
173 744 F.2d 1387 (1984).171 Id. at 1395. Although the court found him Dusky competent, it is unclear
whether this determination was made while Bee was on or off Thorazine. See
also Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1051 n.19 (1990) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).
'75 Bee, 744 F. 2d at 1395.
17 6 Id.
17 7 Id. (quoting UTAm CODE ANN. §64-7-36(10)(c) (Supp. 1983)). No such deter-
mination had been made with regard to Bee.
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criminal context where competency to stand trial is the articulated state
interest. 178
V. ADDITIONAL CONCERNS WITH FORCIBLY MEDICATING A MENTALLY ILL
DEFENDANT TO ATTAIN COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
The Mental Health Standards provides no right to refuse "ordinary and
reasonable treatment" to restore trial competence, but does recognize a
liberty interest in refusing hazardous medication. 17 9 That the Mental
Health Standards includes antipsychotic medication within the descrip-
tion of ordinary and reasonable 8 0 is difficult to explain given that the
primary and side effects of many of these drugs are both physically and
mentally intrusive, occur rapidly, and are not capable of being resisted.' 81
Research conducted on several of the antipsychotic drugs confirms that
patients whose subjective response to antipsychotic medication is nega-
tive suffer even more severe side effects than those who do not refuse. 82
Much of the impetus that propelled the development of at least a qualified
right to refuse in the patient/prisoner context was the evidence that an-
tipsychotic drugs were being abused in institutions to control the pa-
tients.18 3 There seems to be ample cause for an equivalent amount of
concern for abuse in the trial setting where the states interest may be so
compelling as to invoke treatment that in another context might reason-
ably be labelled abusive. Involving an accused in deciding what form of
treatment to attain competency would be most acceptable is not only
responsive to a mentally ill defendant's needs but also may enhance his
willingness to cooperate in the trial process.'8
178 It is ironic that this strong recognition of a parallel right to refuse should
come in a federal court, since the federal right to refuse even in the civil setting
is generally weaker than the state right to refuse. See Callahan & Longmire,
Psychiatric Patients' Right to Refuse Psychotropic Medication: A National Survey,
7 MENTAL DIsALrrY L. REP. 494, 495 (1983) (forty-five states recognized a qual-
ified right to refuse medication).
179 MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 7-4.10(d).
180 Id. and commentary n.1.
181 See Legal Limitations, supra note 121, at 366-67. See also Gelman, Mental
Health Drugs, Professionalism, and the Constitution, 72 GEo. L. J. 1725, 1751
(1984) (antipsychotic drugs "possess a remarkable potential for undermining in-
dividual will and self-direction, thereby producing a psychological state of unusual
receptiveness to the directions of custodians.")
112 Van Putten & May, Subjective Response as a Predictor of Outcome in Phar-
macotherapy: The Consumer Has a Point, 35 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 477 (1978).
See also Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1049 n.11, 1050 n.15, 1051 n.18
(1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
18 When John Rennie complained about Prolixin, the doctor doubled his dose.
See Antipsychotic Medication, supra note 1, at 189. The Rennie Court noted that
a nurse who had recorded Rennie's adverse side effects was later criticized and
intimidated for doing so by her superiors. Id. at 188.
14 See Antipsychotic Medication, supra note 20, at 375 (involvement has been
found to enhance patient dignity in institutional setting while not increasing
illness).
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The coercive use of antipsychotic drugs to enable a criminal defendant
to meet the Dusky standard may raise additional problems. Drugs that
affect the emotions may inhibit the defendant's ability to function prop-
erly as defendant. Although the desired effects of antipsychotic medica-
tion may gain for the defendant a capacity to understand the proceedings
and assist his counsel, other effects of the drugs such as diminished anx-
iety, unnatural apathy and an increased level of trust for adversaries
may diminish his motivation to help his lawyer's defense. Thus, although
the patient may be technically competent per Dusky, he may nonetheless
be denied what should arguably be the state's proper interest, a fair trial.
Additionally, the high possibility of unwarranted prejudice in the eyes
of the trier of fact due to the altered personality and behavior of a de-
fendant on antipsychotic drugs may not be adequately addressed by way
of explanation. 186 Furthermore, just as a witness might be tempted to lie
about an absent defendant, he might also be tempted to do so about an
unusually placid or distant one.
It is evident from the case law that criminal cases have often empha-
sized the state's intended effects of antipsychotics and have given little
or diminished attention to adverse side effects. By contrast, the civil courts
which have addressed the right of psychiatric patients to refuse antip-
sychotic medication have generally done so by reference to the drugs'
deleterious effects. 18 6 While it is obvious that the state's asserted interests
differ in the criminal and civil commitment areas, 8 7 it is less clear why
the legal analysis and judicial concern about the deleterious side effects
of antipsychotic drugs that the civil decisions bring to the right to refuse
should not find equivalent relevance in the criminal area. Even the fear
that a mentally ill criminal defendant may attempt to avoid trial by
feigning or inducing incompetence may be adequately handled with less
intrusive methods than forcible antipsychotic medication. Indeed it might
be fairer, given the intrusive nature of the antipsychotics, to waive the
competency requirement rather than compelling it against a defendant's
will. 18
It may be quite difficult for a jury to look past the emotionless and rational
defendant in court and see the serious psychosis from which he suffers. Further-
more, it may be unreasonable to expect a jury to acknowledge the seriousness of
a mental disease that can be "cured" by a brief course of treatment with drugs
that are considered not to impair mental processes. A psychiatrist who testified
on behalf of a defendant recognized this dilemma. When asked whether the de-
fendant was better able to assist his attorney while taking antipsychotic drugs,
the doctor replied, '"his I cannot answer directly because maybe his attorney's
defense would be better when he is at his worst." Quoted in COMMfrrEE ON PSY.
CmATRY AND LAw, GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, MISUSE OF PSY-
CHIATRY IN THE CRIMINAL COURTS: COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 876 (1975).
i See Gutheil & Applebaum, supra note 162, at 96-98.
18 See Antipsychotic Medication, supra note 1, at 201-13.
" See Incompetency to Stand Trail, supra note 121, at 261.
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VI. ALTERNATIVES TO FORCIBLE MEDICATION TO ATTAIN COMPETENCY
TO STAND TRIAL
Constitutional law has long recognized the "least restrictive alterna-
tive" argument to invalidate excessive state regulation of fundamental
constitutional rights.19 In view of the severe side effects of antipsychotic
drugs, forcible medication cannot be viewed as a reasonable response to
the need to achieve competence for trial if there exists "less drastic means
for achieving the same basic purpose."'- In the civil cases, the least
restrictive alternative to forcible antipsychotics has included seclusion,
a less intrusive alternative medication like tranquilizers or sedatives, an
alternative therapy or even a temporary discontinuation of medication. 9 1
Professor Brooks has written:
The least restrictive alternative doctrine, if properly applied,
encourages the striking of a balance between efficacy and in-
trusiveness. The emphasis is not exclusively on avoiding an
intrusion. Rather, the concept stresses the avoidance of un-
necessary or gratuitous intrusions which may occur because of
rigidity, inattentiveness or lack of sensitivity. The efficacy issue
is important. An efficacious treatment, such as medication,
need not be avoided because it is intrusive. Often, medications
are the least restrictive alternative. It is not always easy to
adjust the balance required by the least restrictive alternative
requirement. The value of the concept is that it calls attention
to the need to strike the balance.
92
The application of least restrictive alternative analysis to managing a
criminal defendant who is not Dusky competent to stand trial may require
- See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972) ("It is not sufficient
for the State to show that duration residence requirements further a very sub-
stantial state interest. In pursuing that important interest, the State cannot
choose means that unnecessarily burden or restrict constitutionally protected
activity .... If there are other reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser
burden on constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of
greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose 'less drastic means.' ") (quoting
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
,90 Shelton, 464 U.S. at 488 (invalidating a statute requiring public school
teachers to disclose all organizations to which they belong because "less drastic
means for achieving the same basic purpose" are available). See also Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (governmental purpose "'may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the
area of protected freedoms.' ") (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307
(1963)).
191 See Antipsychotic Medication, supra note 1, at 193.
'1'Id. In Rennie, Judge Brotman illustrated the least restrictive alternative
requirement by pointing out that experts on both sides in the case had testified
that Lithium combined with an antidepressant might be more efficacious and less
harmful to Rennie than the Prolixin or Thorazine he had been compelled to
receive. 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1146 (1978).
1989-901
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
a determination of whether an alternate treatment method should at least
be tried before using a more intrusive means such as antipsychotic med-
ication. Verbal psychotherapy and behavioral modification techniques
utilizing positive reinforcement 93 are both arguably less intrusive and,
therefore, less restrictive of the liberty interests at stake than antipsy-
chotic medication. 194 The effectiveness of these techniques in treating the
psychiatric disorders causing trial incapacity is essential to deciding
whether they are in fact alternatives; such a determination may need to
be made on a case by case basis.195 The least restrictive alternative may
not require that the less intrusive option be as effective as the more
intrusive treatment. Thus, it is not clear whether a determination that
antipsychotic medications produce a higher level of trial competency than
the alternate psychiatric techniques would shift the balance toward the
use of drug therapy. It is at least arguably feasible, using the least re-
strictive alternative approach, that a trial judge should defer to an other-
wise competent defendant's request not to receive antipsychotic
medication for a test period, during which less intrusive therapy could
be administered to achieve Dusky competency. If the defendant attains
trial competency without antipsychotic medication, then he should be
tried in such condition. However, if the less intrusive treatment methods
fail to restore competency to stand trial within a reasonable period, then
drug treatment may become the least restrictive alternative which may
then be administered even if the defendant continues to object.
Some of the civil commitment cases involving incompetent adults re-
veal a reluctance to order treatment with antipsychotic drugs unless it
can be determined that the patient, if competent, would consent. 196 Such
a determination requires that a judge or guardian consider both the fac-
tors that the ward, if competent, would consider in deciding whether to
consent to treatment, as well as any indications there may be as to what
weight the ward would give to such factors. 197 Such a determination is
called "substituted judgment"' 98 and is distinguished from the choice a
'
93 At least when not placing the defendant in a state of deprivation at the
outset of therapy.
-9 See Winick, supra note 5, at 813. A defendant could show that antipsychotic
drugs were not the least restrictive alternative by reference to studies showing
that "perhaps fifty percent of outpatient schizophrenics might not be worse off if
their medications were withdrawn" as well as to "the increasing number of med-
ical commentators calling for a reexamination of prolonged maintenance anti-
psychotic drug therapy and recommending periodic 'drug free holidays' to deter-
mine the feasibility of drug discontinuation." Id.
1,5 If these techniques fail to affect trial competence, the state's concern
that an accused is "using" the incompetency principles to avoid trial may be
heightened; in such a scenario, antipsychotic drugs may become the least restric-
tive alternative. The state, however, may be required to attempt to strike the
balance between avoidable intrusiveness and efficacy.
9 See Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981); Rogers v.
Commissioner of Dep't of Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983).
197 See In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979).
"I See Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 750-59, 370
N.E.2d 417, 430-35 (1977).
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reasonable person might make or from one that is necessarily in the
incompetent person's "best interests."199 Thus, where there are indications
that an incompetent would have, even if competent, refused a demon-
strably beneficial course of treatment, judges have been unwilling to
compel it 200 because of the patient's interest in freedom from nonconsen-
sual invasion of his body.20 1 Application of substituted judgment analysis
to the mentally ill criminal defendant awaiting trial may require judicial
assertion of the least restrictive doctrine where the accused is incompetent
to raise the issue on his own.
Another alternative to forcibly medicating a mentally ill defendant to
attain trial competency is to view a defendant's decision to refuse anti-
psychotic medication as a waiver in advance of his due process right to
be tried while competent should the absence of medication cause decom-
pensation. Such an alternative would address the state's concern that the
incompetency doctrine not be abused by defendants to avoid trial alto-
gether per the Jackson v. Indiana20 2 decision; the trial would go on. An-
other justification for the insistence of a competent defendant, the need
to protect the dignity and decorum of the trial process, could be met by
allowing the trial judge to deal with such issues if and when they emerge.
If a refusing defendant deteriorates off medication to the point where
judicial decorum becomes a problem, a judge has the same sanctions
available to him as with misbehavior at trial by non-mentally ill de-
fendants.203 If necessary, rather than being required to accept antipsy-
chotic drugs to control behavior, the defendant could be excused from the
courtroom for brief periods and the trial could continue in his absence. 20 4
The state's valid interest in the accuracy and apparent fairness of the
criminal process 20 5 should not be undermined to a greater extent by al-
lowing the trial of a defendant who has refused to become competent
through the use-of antipsychotic drugs than it is by allowing the trial of
- Roe, 383 Mass. at 434-35, 421 N.E.2d at 51-52. However, the preferences of
the incompetent patient are not necessarily determinative; even if a guardian
asserts his ward's unwillingness to accept antipsychotic drugs, the court may
override the refusal if the ward is found to be dangerous. Rogers, 390 Mass. at
510, 458 N.E.2d at 321. See also Brooks, supra note 20, at 366.
See, e.g., Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., 293 Md. 685, 447 A.2d 1244
(1982).
21 See Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 728, 370 N.E.2d at 417.
202 406 U.S. 715 (1972). See supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text. If the
defendant is not competent to waive his due process objection to trial while in-
competent, then substituted judgment analysis should become relevant to deter-
mine if there is a waiver.
The sanctions available avoid having to postpone the trial altogether. See
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). Where necessary, the judge could declare
a mistrial, even over the defendant's objection, without barring a future trial on
the basis of double jeopardy. See Ham v. Jabe, 706 F.2d 765, 767 (6th Cir. 1983).
See Allen, 397 U.S. at 342-43; FED. R. CriM. P. 43(b) & (c). The validity of
the concern for avoiding criminal trials that threaten the decorum of the court
is undercut by great tolerance of equivalent or worse conduct by patients in civil
commitment hearings.
See Note, supra note 48, at 457-58.
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a defendant whose demeanor has been purposefully altered by the state
through drug therapy. Indeed, the Massachusetts supreme court, when
faced with a defense demand to be tried in an unmedicated state, held
that the defendant had such a right because no expert description of the
medication's effects on the defendant was an adequate substitute for the
jurors actually seeing the accused in his unmedicated state.206 The court
considered the antipsychotic medication's effects on the defendant's de-
meanor both in ascertaining credibility and in determining the substan-
tive issue of mental non-responsibility and held that, if the accused is
willing to waive being tried while competent in order to present accurate
demeanor testimony to the jury, he has the right to do so. 20 7 It seems
reasonable to extend this ability to waive being tried while competent in
order to avoid the acknowledged powerful side effects that the antipsy-
chotics produce.
VII. CONCLUSION
An examination of the case law and commentary on the right to refuse
antipsychotic medication reveals that in the civil commitment area the
right to refuse is granted more potency by the state decisions that have
discussed the issue than by the federal courts which have retained more
control in the hands of medical professionals. 20 8 Also revealed is a will-
ingness, even among those courts recognizing a meaningful right to refuse
antipsychotic drugs by a patient/prisoner, to emphasize in criminal cases
the effect of the drugs in restoring competency to stand trial while giving
less serious consideration to the medications' deleterious side effects.
While the Mental Health Standards accepts that the state's goal in forcibly
medicating in the criminal cases is different than that in the civil com-
mitment cases, this distinction does not necessarily justify the conclusion
that there should be no meaningful right to refuse for a criminal de-
fendant who is mentally ill, while there is such a right for an involuntarily
committed patient/prisoner. Valid alternatives to forcible medication with
antipsychotics do exist to meet the concerns of the state even in the
criminal trial context. Perhaps what is most revealed is that the entire
area of the forcible use of antipsychotic medication in both the civil and
criminal contexts would greatly benefit from direct and clear Supreme
Court guidance.
BRIAN DOMB
206 Commonwealth v. Louraine, 390 Mass. 28, 35, 453 N.E.2d 437, 442 (1983).
"o
7 Id. at 38 n.13, 453 N.E.2d at 444 n.13.
Is See supra notes 137-70 and accompanying text. This trend may reverse itself
with the anticipated Supreme Court decision in Harper v. State, 110 Wash. 2d
873, 759 P.2d 385 (1988).
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